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DUAL COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN PATENT
PROTECTION: WORKS OF ART AND
ORNAMENTAL DESIGNS
The legislative evolution of copyright and design patent statutes
has resulted in an overlapping zone of protection with respect to cer-
tain works of art and ornamental designs. A review of legislative his-
tory might lead one to conclude that Congress intended to make
concurrent coverage available in this narrow band of endeavor. Yet,
the same examination might indicate that such overlap was nothing
more than the result of inadvertence. Seemingly adopting the latter ap-
proach, courts have traditionally denied dual and concurrent copyright
and design patent protection for a work qualified under both statutes.
By judicial interpretation, the owner of such work has been compelled
to choose either a copyright or design patent, his election thereafter
barring any alternate coverage."
In a recent break with precedent, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, in In re Yardley,2 disregarded the election doctrine, holding
that the proprietor of an artistic design for a work of art may, in a
proper case, obtain dual copyright and design patent protection. The
1974 Yardley decision departed from case law that had survived for 64
years,3 and answered a question avoided by the Supreme Court 20 years
earlier.4 To fully appreciate the significance of this decision, however,
an overview of the development of copyright and patent law is war-
ranted.
DIFFERENTIATING COPYRIGHT AND PATENT PROTECTION
Copyrights and patents are governmental grants of monopolies af-
forded authors and inventors for their "respective Writings and Dis-
coveries."5i Although these grants reward individual contributions, their
primary purpose is to foster social and industrial development for the
public good. Consequently, Congress was given the power to implement
' See, e.g., In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
2493 F.2d 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
3 The judicial doctrine which required the owner of a dual qualifying design to
elect either copyright or design patent protection first arose in 1910. See Louis De Jonge
& Co. v. Breuker 9- Kessler Co., 182 F. 150 (C.C.S.E.D. Pa. 1910), aff'd, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir.
1911), aff'd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914). See also text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
4 In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court touched upon the elec-
tion doctrine but refused to decide its validity because the issue was not properly pre-
sented for resolution. See text accompanying note 148 infra.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932)
(copyrights and patents are given as incentives for further productive and ingenious
efforts).
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these societal concerns by awarding monopolies which would other-
wise be contrary to a freely competitive system. As noted by Mr. Jus-
tice Reed:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors .... Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 6
Although at times viewed interchangeably by laymen, a copyright
is not the equivalent of a patent.7 The rights protected by each are
distinct and may be illustrated in the following example. Assume a
chemist, having discovered a new chemical mixture which yields a pre-
viously unknown curing agent, chooses to write a book detailing his
experiments and the relative proportions of the chemicals used. Should
the chemist secure a copyright on his book, he would retain the exclu-
sive right to print, reprint, and publish the work. The contents, how-
ever, would remain open to public exploitation; the chemist could not
prevent others from following his instructions and producing the med-
0 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See also United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44
(2d Cir. 1964).
7The substantive and procedural differences between copyrights and patents were
outlined in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
The court explained:
The owner of a patent is granted the exclusive right to exploit for a period
[a maximum of fourteen years for design patents] the conception that is the
subject matter of the patent .... The grant of this monopoly, however, is
carefully circumscribed by substantive and procedural protections. To be pat-
entable the subject matter must be new and useful, and represent a nonobvious
advance . . . an advance that would not be obvious to a hypothetical person
skilled in the art and charged with knowledge of all relevant developments
publicly known to that point in time .... A patent is granted only after an
independent administrative inquiry and determination that these substantive
standards have been met .... This determination is subject to both adminis-
trative and court review ....
Copyright registration, on the other hand, confers no right at all to the
conception reflected in the registered subject matter ... Accordingly, the pre-
requisites for copyright registration are minimal. The work offered for regis-
tration need only be a product of the registrant. So long as it is not a plagia-
rized copy of another's effort, there is no requirement that the work differ
substantially from prior works or that it contribute anything of value. . . . A
copyright is secured simply by publishing the work with the required notice
k * J and registration is accomplished simply by filing a claim . . . with the
Register of Copyrights. .. . There is no administrative investigation . . . of
the validity of the claim. A certificate is refused only if the object falls outside
the broad category of matter subject to copyright registration .... A copyright
affords little protection .... Because the registrant's protection is limited and
the social cost therefore small, the life of the copyright is long. ..
Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted).
See also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951);
Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
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icine for commercial gain.8 Had the chemist obtained a patent encom-
passing the manufacturing process, he would have precluded others
from using the process and selling the drug for the term of the grant.
Thus, the copyright protects the form of expression of the author's
ideas, not the ideas themselves.9 As a consequence, the copyright mo-
nopoly is limited to "the exclusive right... [t]o print, reprint, publish,
copy, and vend the copyrighted -work ... ."10 However, the forms of
expression potentially protected by the copyright are not restricted to
those manifested in printed books. The applicable statute broadly pro-
vides that works subject to copyright "shall include all the writings of
an author."1 1 The breadth of statutory coverage is evidenced by pro-
vision for fourteen classes of copyrightable works, including musical
compositions, photographs, and motion pictures.12 Accordingly, in seek-
ing a copyright, the applicant must indicate the class of intellectual
endeavor he wishes to protect.13
In contrast to the more limited protection of the copyright laws
is the complete monopoly granted by a patent to the ingenious labors
of an inventor. A patent gives "the right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States ....,14
To be patentable, an invention must be a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and use-
8 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, I02-03 (1880).
9 See, e.g., id.; Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945). As has
been repeatedly held, there is no copyright available for ideas. See, e.g., M.M. Business
Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1139 (6th Cir. 1973). This rule is recognized
in the regulations of the Copyright Office, which deny a copyright grant to "[i]deas,
plans, methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in which
they are expressed or described in a writing." 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1974).
10 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § l(f) (Supp. I, 1971).
11 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), Mr. Justice Douglas,
in his dissenting opinion, questioned the constitutionality of granting a copyright to
models or designs for works of art. He noted that the Court had never held this classi-
fication, along with other classes of copyrightable subject matter, as defined in 17 U.S.C.
§ 5 (1970), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. I, 1971), to be within the constitutional
ambit of the "writings" of "Authors." Justice Douglas did comment, however, that,
prior to Mazer, articles such as bookends, clocks, lamps, candlesticks, and piggy banks
had been granted copyright registration as works of art. 347 U.S. at 220.
The constitutional scope of the term "writings" has never been directly considered
by the Court. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), however,
the Court held a photograph to be copyrightable. In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph-
ing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), a chromolithograph, used as a circus advertisement, was
found to be within the copyright laws. Thus, it seems that the Court has and will con-
tinue to construe the term "writings" very broadly.
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. I, 1971).
13 Id. The applicant is to specify in which enumerated class, (a) through (n), he
desires to place his work. These specifications, however, "shall not limit the subject
matter of copyright as defined in section 4 .... " Id.
14 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
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ful improvement thereof ... -15 Design patents, on the other hand, are
not concerned with the mechanical or utilitarian features of a "ma-
chine," but rather are granted to one who "invents any new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture ... ,"16 Thus, the
prime factor in granting a design patent for an article of manufacture
is its decorative and eye appeal. The question to be asked is not "what
will it do," but "how does it look?" 17
Despite apparent dissimilarities, an area of overlap exists between
copyright and design patent protection.' This field of coverage appears
restricted to a small group of works copyrightable as "works of art;
models or designs for works of art."'1 To the extent that the artwork
can be applied to an article of manufacture, imparting to it an original,
ornamental design, the proprietor may merit dual protection. Qualifi-
cation for recognition under both schemes seemingly would depend on
a determination that the work meets the prerequisites of each statute.
The requirements for qualification, however, differ greatly, since each
statute protects separate conceptual characteristics.
Copyright Prerequisites
Both the copyright and design patent statutes encompass the pro-
tection of aesthetic qualities. Yet, their respective protections are dis-
tinct in that "the dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is "not beauty
and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original and
15 Id. § 101.
16Id. § 171 (emphasis added).
17 Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co., 112 F. 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1901). The Supreme Court,
in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872), defined the nature of the design
patent and the aspects contemplated as patentable:
The acts of Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were
plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts. They contem-
plate not so much utility as appearance, and that, not an abstract impression or
picture, but an aspect given to those objects mentioned in the acts.. . . And
the thing invented or produced, for which the patent is given, is that which
gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to
which it may be applied, or to which it gives form. The law manifestly contem-
plates that giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured
article may enhance its salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may
be a meritorious service to the public. It therefore proposes to secure for a
limited time to the ingenious producer of those appearances the advantages
flowing from them.... It is the appearance itself . .. that constitutes mainly,
if not entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy
of recompense.
Id. at 524-25. See also Majestic Elec. Dev. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 276 F.
676 (9th Cir. 1921); Baker v. Hughes-Evans Co., 270 F. 97 (2d Cir. 1920).
18 See, e.g., 1 M. NiMMER, THE LAw Or COPYRIGHT § 38 (1974). See also note 114
and accompanying text infra.
19 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1970). See, e.g., In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A.
1974).
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ornamental design for design patents. '20 Regulations of the Copyright
Office explicitly require that a work of art or a model or design for a
work of art be capable of independent existence as a work Qf art, irre-
spective of its utilitarian embodiment.21 The art value alone comes
within the purview of the copyright monopoly.
Aside from independent existence as a work of art, the sole re-
maining copyright prerequisite is that the item be an original work
of its author.22 The work must owe its existence to the creator and be
the independent result of his intellectual efforts.23 Generally, since a
copyrightable work need not be unique or novel,24 the quantum of
originality that must be present is minimal. The judicial yardstick has
been the presence of an independent contribution by the author.25 One
court recently stated that "any 'distinguishable variation' resulting
from an author's independent creative endeavor will constitute suffi-
cient originality. " 26 Thus, the originality demanded for copyright pro-
20 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
21 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1947) states:
[Ijf the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic
sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified sepa-
rately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features
will be eligible for registration.
This statement should be read in conjunction with the Supreme Court's description
of the aspects of a utilitarian article. See note 17 supra. The design patent contemplates
the appearance of the article inseparable from its ornamentation. The copyright, on
the other hand, is granted if the design can stand on its own as an autonomous work
of art.
22Neither the Constitution nor the copyright laws mandate originality as a pre-
requisite to copyrightability. See, e.g., Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401,
402 (2d Cir. 1971). Although the patent laws define specific elements necessary for a
patentable invention or design, the copyright laws do not. Originality seems to have
developed as a corollary to the statutory requirement of authorship. In Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme Court defined an author
to be, in the constitutional sense of the word, "'[hie to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker .... Id. at 58.
23 See, e.g., M.M. Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1139 (6th Cir.
1973); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970); Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). See also I M.
Nimhmi, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 6 (1974).
24 It has been consistently held that novelty or uniqueness play no role in the
determination of copyrightability. The term "authorship" does not require the presence
of these qualities. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); Scott v. WKJG, Inc.,
376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967). Although there have been isolated statements to the
effect that copyrightability does entail some measure of novelty, see, e.g., Puddu v.
Buonamid Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971), this does not appear to be
the majority position.
25 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951),
wherein the court stated: "Mo satisfy both the Constitution and the statute ... the
'author' [must contribute] ...something recognizably 'his own.'" Id. at 103 (footnote
omitted).
28M.M. Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1139 (6th Cir. 1973).
See also Best Medium Publishing Co. v. National Insider, Inc., 385 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1967).
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tection would appear to be satisfied if the work is the product of
autonomous creative effort. The "creative effort" which a work of art
must embody27 would appear to relate to the formative process; the




As the grant of a patent monopoly completely bars the use of the
patented article by others, its statutory prerequisites are stricter than
those employed with respect to copyrights.29 The prospective patentee
must present a device which is novel,80 original,8 1 and nonobvious.8 2 A
27 The requirement of creativity is found in the regulations of the Copyright Office.
"In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody some creative
authorship in its delineation or form." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1974).
28 In Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), the district court discussed the element of creativity as it relates to copyrightable
works of art. While originality relates to the author's independent contribution to the
artwork, creativity contemplates the nature of the work. Creativity merely refers to the
work being artistic in nature and "not supplied through innovations which are solely
utilitarian or mechanical." Id. at 781. See also 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1974).
29 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971);
note 7 supra. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1966) (the stricter
tests are necessary to weed out those inventions not meritorious of the exclusive grant
so that the growth of commerce will not be retarded).
8035 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
81 Id. § 101.
82 Id. § 103. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Supreme Court
stated that the requirement of nonobviousness means that an invention
which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may
still not be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was
known before is not considered suffidently great to warrant a patent. . . . If
this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter
cannot be patented.
Id. at 14.
In Graham, the Court considered the test of nonobviousness as applied to mechani-
cal patents. There has been some conflict, however, as to the extent to which the test
of nonobviousness is to influence the ultimate grant of a design patent. The conflict
centers about 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) which, in part, provides:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art of which said subject matter pertains.
This section is applicable to design patents through § 171.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found difficulty in applying the test of
"a person having ordinary skill in the art" in In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A.
1966). There, the court took a lenient approach toward design patent applications. It
reasoned that since most of the work of industrial designing is done by ordinary crafts-
men employed as designers, a complete acceptance of mechanical patent prerequisites
would bar the grant of design patents to the majority of these works. Id. at 1006. Ulti-
mately, the court held that the test of obviousness, as pertaining to designs, was to be
made according to the eye of the ordinary intelligent person. The court reasoned that
since the test must be a visual one, and since all individuals react differently to ap-
pearances, the opinion of the normal observer should determine whether the design was
obvious or not. Id. The court believed that such a requirement would foster the progress
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design patentee must demonstrate, in addition, ornamentability3 3 and
a primary purpose for the design which is not functional or utilitar-
ian. 4 Moreover, the use of inventive faculties in the conception of a
patentable design has been judicially demanded.85 This element of in-
ventiveness must extend to the article's ornamentability and appear-
ance,8 the traditional standard of inquiry being whether the ordinary
observer can distinguish novelty in its appearance.37
Originality, as it relates to designs, is not satisfied by the copy-
right standard of independent creation by the designer. Instead, this
requirement contemplates a design entirely new and not known be-
fore.38 Furthermore, the prerequisites of inventiveness, novelty, and
originality are not satisfied by the presence of new mechanical func-
tions.3 9 On the contrary, if the article owes its pleasing appearance to
these mechanical functions, the design patent should not be issued.40
of industrial designs. Id. at 1006. Accord, Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Schilling, 421 F.2d 747 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
In reaching its decision, the Laverne court construed § 171 as distinguishing design
and inventional patents. Thus, the court concluded it was the legislative intent to treat
the two differently. 356 F.2d at 1005. This reasoning, however, contradicts the language
of § 171, which provides: "The provisions ... relating to patents for inventions shall
apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970). There
is in fact no provision that excepts design patents from the literal operation of the
§ 103 requirement of nonobviousness. See §§ 101-03.
In Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1972), the
ordinary intelligent person test was rejected. In Hadco, the Third Circuit pointed out
that, insofar as the issue of obviousness is concerned, the law for both design and inven-
tional patents is the same. The court could not reconcile the statutory interpretation
of the Laverne court. Rather, the Third Circuit noted: "[A]ny basic change in present
standards and requirements should be by appropriate legislative reform rather than
judicial fiat." Id. at 1272.
It now appears that the literal requirement of nonobviousness, as construed in
Graham, is applied when testing the validity of design patents. See Fields v. Schuyler,
472 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33 See Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968).
34 See id. See also Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1269
(3d Cir. 1972).
35 See, e.g., Frantz Mfg. Co. v. Phenix Mfg. Co., 457 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1972), wherein
the court stated:
[A] patented design, like the subject matter of a mechanical patent, must em-
body invention. The purpose of the statute is to reward, and thereby to en-
courage, creative artistic activity rather than mere changes of detail which
may produce "novelty" but do not reflect "invention."
Id. at 327.
38 See Hopkins v. Waco Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1953) ("A mechanical
patent must disclose inventive novelty and utility-a design patent inventive originality
in design and ornamentation").
37 See Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1272 (3rd Cir. 1972),
wherein the court held that the ordinary observer test is to be utilized in weighing the
novelty and ornamentation of a design for an article of manufacture.
8 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Waco Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1953).
89 See D. Klein & Son, Inc. v. Giant Umbrella Co., 341 F. Supp. 1400, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
10 See Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968). It should
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Infringement
Parallel to the wide variance existing between the requirements
of copyrightability and patentability is the difference in establishing
infringement of either monopoly. This is partially a result of the le-
nient standard of originality in copyright law. Theoretically, two car-
tographers could set out separately to capture the geography of the same
area. If both men were perfectionists, each would produce an identical
map. Yet, the map maker who published second would not have in-
fringed the copyright of his previously published colleague since each
map was the independent creative work of its respective author.41 Con-
sequently, a multitude of valid copyrights may exist, each having the
same or nearly identical subject matter and format. No question of
infringement need ever arise if each work product has been indepen-
dently created.42
To establish a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant had access to the allegedly copied work43 and
that substantial similarity exists between the forms embodying plain-
tiff's and defendant's labors.44 When direct evidence of access is un-
available, courts have allowed an inference of access to be drawn from
striking similarities between the contested works.45 Despite the avail-
ability of this inference, proof of infringement remains difficult be-
cause the standard of substantial similarity is "of necessity vague.140
This vagueness is compounded by the fact that the infringement of
artwork entails copying not the idea itself, but the expression of the
idea47 as viewed by the ordinary observer.41 Accordingly, any attempt
be noted, however, that the mere presence of a new mechanical function will not invali-
date or foreclose a design patent. Such protection will be afforded where the inventive
faculty relates to the ornamentation design and is distinguishable from mechanical
functions. See Hopkins v. Waco Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1953).
41See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104 n.21 (2d Cir.
1951).
421d. at 103. Since it is much easier to establish the copyright requirement of
originality, a copyright should be less susceptible to an infringement claim than a com-
parable attack on a patent. See I M. NiammE, THE LAW OF COPYXUGHT § 10.1 (1974).
Because the burden of establishing an infringement is necessarily high, clearly the copy-
right affords lesser protection than does a patent. Id.
43 See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
44 See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
45 See Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967). See also Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946). Although similarity may lessen the burden
of showing access, the reverse is not true. Therefore, strong evidence that the defendant
had access to the allegedly infringed work will never lessen the burden of showing
substantial similarity. See Williams v. Kaag Mfrs., Inc., 338 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1964).
46 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
47 Id.
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to establish substantial similarity between artistic works where one is
allegedly a copy must overcome the obstacles created by varying indi-
vidual aesthetic sensitivities.
Where the claim is one of design patent infringement, the burden
of proof is not as great. This result follows naturally from the higher
burden met by the patentee in obtaining his grant. The test for in-
fringement is whether the ordinary observer may be misled into buy-
ing the infringing article because of its like appearance to the patented
design.49 Unlike his copyright counterpart, the patentee-plaintiff is not
required to establish access and copying. Instead, a designer, like an
inventor, is charged with knowledge, actual or constructive, of all prior
designsY0° Therefore, an independently created design, though nonac-
tionable as a copyright infringement, may nonetheless represent an
infringement of a prior design patent.5 1
Based on the distinctive protection provided by copyright and de-
sign patent statutes, the desire for dual and concurrent coverage has
arisen. Such protection is particularly apt where an artistic design can
be easily divorced from the host article and readily applicable to other
items of differing utilitarian function. 52 Under these circumstances, an
inventor-designer could initially copyright his artistic design. Having
done so, he might incorporate the design into a number of serviceable
articles, such as vases, pitchers, goblets, dishes, or ashtrays. Assuming
48 Under this test, the bona fide copyrightee would be protected from nearly exact
reproductions of his art because the ordinary observer would not be required to examine
the copy for minute differences. If the overall artistic appeal of the original and the
counterfeit appear the same to this ordinary observer, then infringement would be found.
"[U]nless he set out to detect the disparities, [h]e would be disposed to overlook them,
and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same. That is enough .... ." Id. (emphasis
added). See also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966);
Williams v. Kaag Mfrs., Inc., 338 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1964).
49 As stated by the Court in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872):
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such
as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to
be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.
Id. at 528.
5 See Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1972),
wherein the court stated: "It is basic that the patenteee, as a designer, is chargeable
with a comprehensive knowledge of . . . prior art." Id. at 1274. See also Alfred Bell &-
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
51 See 1 M. NiMxMER, THE LAw or COPYRIGHT § 10.1 (1974).
52 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The copyrighted statuettes of male
and female Balinese dancers therein used as electric lamp bases could have well been
used in other articles such as bookends, vases or candelabras. In In re Yardley, 493 F.2d
1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974), the petitioner's patented design for a watch face was patented
without the hour numerals printed on the design. Therefore, this design could be
applied to other items as well.
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the design imparts inventive ornamentality to any or all of these items
design patent protection could then be sought.
Unfortunately, the traditional election approach prohibited the
inventor from proceeding in the foregoing manner. While recognizing
the existence of an overlapping zone encompassing works of art, courts
nevertheless refrained from granting monopolies in both the copyright
and patent spheres.5 3 Thus, when considering registration of a work,
copyrightable due to its artistic merit and patentable as a result of its
commercially useful inventive ornamentation, the creator would be
compelled to forego one realm of coverage in order to obtain the other.
Responding to this incongruity and finding no statutory or policy man-
date for the foreclosure of one monopoly in the presence of another,
In re Yardley54 rejected the election doctrine.
In re Yardley: JUDICIAL DEMISE OF THE ELECTION DOCTRINE
At issue before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Yard-
ley was a rejection of a design patent application for a novelty watch
face. Accompanying its application to the Patent Office examiner,
Yardley submitted a drawing depicting a caricature of former Vice
President Spiro Agnew with arms extended as hour and minute hands.
Omitted from the drawing, however, were the hour numerals. In af-
firming the rejection of the examiner, the Patent Office Board of Ap-
peals found the design to be "obvious." 55 Moreover, noting that Yardley
had previously registered the design for the watch face with the Copy-
right Office, the Board held that he was barred under the election doc-
trine from obtaining a design patent grant 5 6
In reversing the Board's decision, the court first considered the is-
sue of obviousness. The prior work consisted of a design patent issued
for the "Breger" design. This, too, was an ornamental watch face de-
sign depicting a person with extended arms employed as hour and
minute hands.5 7 Unlike the Yardley design, the Breger work included
hour numerals and a circular second hand feature. In considering both
designs, the court noted that the human figure could be represented
53 See, e.g., In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
54493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
55 Id. at 1390-91. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970); note 32 supra.
58The fact of the prior copyright registration was made known to the patent
examiner by copies of newspaper advertisements which Yardley had attached to his brief.
The advertisement showed the watch face and bore a copyright notice, "© 1970 The
Novelty Watch Co.," and a further notice of "Pat. pend." 493 F.2d at 1391-92.
57 Although the caricature on the Breger design was not specifically identifiable, the
slick black hair, bulging eyes, the legs spread at 90 degrees in a type of ludicrous dance
step, and the 1930 vintage of the design tends to bring Eddie Cantor to mind. See 493
F.2d at 1390.
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in various ways, subject to obvious changes in "facial, body, and dress
characteristics,"r s and that these traits, individually, could be made to
predominate according to the designer's will. The court did not concur
with the Board's ruling that Yardley's design was obviously derived
from the Breger watch face. Although the concept may have been sim-
ilar, it was the different appearance that controlled.5 9
Having determined that patent protection was otherwise avail-
able, the court next reversed the Board's denial of the patent applica-
tion because of the prior copyright registration.60 In challenging the
validity of the election doctrine, the court framed two questions. First,
the court considered whether there existed an area of overlap between
the copyright and design patent laws wherein a work could qualify for
registration under either statute.61 Second, assuming an affirmative an-
swer to the initial question, the court asked whether the owner could
secure both a copyright and a design patent.62
Relying on prior case law and statutory language, the court had
no difficulty in finding the requisite area of overlap.63 With regard to
58 Id. at 1392.
O9The court appears to have completely overlooked the test of obviousness under
§ 103. See note 32 supra. While the questions of ornamentality and appearance are to
be considered through the eyes of the ordinary observer, the question of obviousness
is answered by relating the work to a designer of ordinary skill in that particular art.
The question then becomes whether it would be obvious for a watch face designer to
incorporate on the face a caricature of a noted personality of the day, i.e., Spiro Agnew.
This type of design work is apparently an old technique, exemplified by the Mickey
Mouse watch, although the latter might be distinguishable as a fictitious character.
Moreover, as the Second Circuit has noted "[Mn such crowded competitive fields as
that of ornamented wrist watches it would seem well nigh impossible to produce any-
thing which can fairly be considered new invention, or a real advance over prior art."
Vacheron & Costantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F2d 637,
642 (2d Cir. 1958) (Clark, Cj., dissenting).
60493 F.2d at 1393. The court noted that the Novelty Watch Company, Yardiey's
assignee, had registered the watch face pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(b) & (g) (1970). It
was the registration under the overlapping band of dual protection existing within
subsection (g), see text accompanying note 19 supra, that caused the appeals board to
reject the design on the basis of the doctrine of election. See In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1927).
It appears that the design would also have been denied dual protection if a design
patent had first been secured. In addition to the doctrine of election, the Copyright
Office regulations provide that a copyright shall not be registered if a prior design
patent has been obtained. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1974).
61493 F.2d at 1393.
02 Id.
03 The statutory phraseology of 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) and 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970) indicated
a congressional intent to recognize a class of works protectable under both schemes.
Moreover, prior to Yardley, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had held the
area of overlap to exist. See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500 n.2
(C.C.P.A. 1961), wherein the Supreme Court's decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954), was cited as the highest judicial recognition of the existence of the overlap.
See also text accompanying notes 114-31 infra.
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the second issue, however, a less secure basis for decision was utilized.
In answering the second inquiry affirnatively, the court drew support
from the absence of a statutory command to the "author-inventor" to
elect either one of the available monopolies. Noting the statutory over-
lap and the failure by Congress to expressly mandate a choice of cov-
erage, the court deemed the doctrine of election to be contrary to
congressional intent6 4 Furthermore, dismissing the Commissioner's
contention that election was required since the framers of the Consti-
tution distinguished authors and inventors, the court held that the
Constitution no more mandated election than did the acts of Congress. 65
The court, in removing any continuing viability from the election
doctrine, rejected the argument of the Commissioner of Patents that
this case was governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.66 Sears held that when the patent term ex-
pires, so does the owner's monopoly. Thereafter, the public has the
right to reproduce the article as previously patented.0 7 In Yardley, the
Commissioner contended that upon expiration of the design patent, a
continuing copyright would prevent the public from acting in the man-
ner contemplated in Sears. Finding Sears inapplicable in that it did not
deal with dual copyright and design patent protection,68 the court re-
fused to deny the design patent solely because a copyright would per-
sist on the artistic subject matter when the patent expired.69
In reaching its decision, the Yardley court unfortunately failed to
expressly denote the different aspects of the creation respectively con-
templated by the copyright and design patent. Yet, differentiating the
zones of protection is vital to reconciling the grant of both monopolies.
While copyright coverage extends to the purely artistic qualities of a
creation, the design patent encompasses its commercial ornamental val-
ues.70 Notwithstanding the court's failure to distinguish the respective
qualities safeguarded by each statute, the Yardley reasoning remains
convincing in view of the apparent intent of Congress to create over-
04 493 F.2d at 1394. The court noted that since the doctrine was founded in dicta,
no "positive legal authority" existed for its support. Id. at 1395. See also note 119 infra.
65 493 F.2d at 1395.
66 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
67 Id. at 230.
68 The question in Sears was whether a state's unfair competition laws could pro-
hibit the copying of an article which was not covered by either a federal patent or
copyright, the issue being one of federal law preemption. Id. at 227-28.
'9 Although not specifically stated, the Yardley court implied that one federal statute
could not preempt another without specific congressional authorization. This would lead
one to conclude that the court considered federal statutes as existing in pari-materia,
to be applied as such in the absence of any express hierarchy of one over the other.
See generally 172 N.Y.L.J. 90, Nov. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
70 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 129-32 infra.
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lapping coverage without a corresponding statutory requirement of
election. A review of the relevant legislative changes to the initial copy-
right and design patent laws over the years should evidence that an
overlapping band of protection was specifically intended and was not
the result of congressional oversight.
LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN PATENT
OVERLAP
Congress is empowered by the Constitution "[tio promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries .... ,,71 Since the word "respective" prefaces the two
fields of endeavor, one might conclude that the draftsmen of the Con-
stitution intended separate protection for the "exclusive right" of "Au-
thors" to their "Writings" and that of "Inventors" to their
"Discoveries." 72 Indeed, Charles Pinckney and James Madison seemed
to advocate that independent coverage be afforded the labors of au-
thors and inventors.73 Significantly, the two fields of endeavor, al-
though mentioned in a single clause in the Constitution, have been
advanced under divergent bodies of legislation.74 Despite this apparent
intent to separate, however, a readily discernible area of overlapping
coverage has crept into the statutory scheme.
Design Patent Evolution
The concept of a design patent developed from a need to halt the
commercial piracy of ornamental designs incorporated into useful ar-
ticles of manufacture.75 The articles themselves may have been of com-
71 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
72 There is case law supporting this construction. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951). However, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in Yardley construed this language as not mandating election since
subsequent acts of Congress provided for an overlapping zone of protection. 493 F.2d at
1893-94.
73 In a letter to the Convention, Mr. Madison urged:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law.
The right to useful invention seems with equal reason to belong to the in-
ventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals.
Tm FEDEALiSr No. 43, at 288 (J. Cooke ed. 1888). See also Fenning, The Origin of the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEo. LJ. 109 (1929).
74 Congress, in implementing this provision, recognized that the framers of the
Constitution had merged twvo separate definable monopolies into one clause. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1952).
75 See Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in
the United States, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 380 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Hudson].
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mon usage and knowledge, e.g., spoons or forks, and therefore not
worthy of a mechanical patent, which at one time was the sole protec-
tion available.78 Yet, the manufacturer of these implements may have
used his inventive genius in designing their shape, configuration, or
ornamentation so as to present an attractive article for sale. Neverthe-
less, since the designer of these ornate utensils was without statutory
protection, his design could be freely copied by others less talented.
The designer was thereby deprived of the fruits of his labor.77
The destruction of incentive and the accompanying adverse im-
pact on industry caused by this piracy were brought to the attention
of Congress in 1841 by then Commissioner of Patents Ellsworth. In
his report, the Commissioner advised:
The law ... should embrace alike the protection of new and orig-
inal designs for a manufacture of metal or other material, or any
new and useful design for the printing of woolens, silk, cotton, or
other fabric, or for a bust, statue, or bas-relief, or composition in
alto or basso-relievo. All this could be effected by simply authoriz-
ing the Commissioner to issue patents for these objects, under the
same limitations and on the same conditions as govern present ac-
tion in other cases.78
In response to this proposal, Congress, in 1842, enacted the first design
patent statute, including almost verbatim, the definitional classes of
patentable designs set forth by Commissioner Ellsworth. 9
76Such was the protection afforded by the first patent statute, which in relevant
part provided:
JjU]pon the petition of any person . , . to the Secretary of State, the Secretary
r the department of war, and the Attorney General of the United States,
setting forth, that he . . . invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used ... it shall ... be lawful . . , for . . . letters patent to be made out in
the name of the United States . . . for any term not exceeding fourteen
years ....
Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
77 See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1872).
78 Hudson, supra note 75, at 881.
79 The Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543 in pertinent part provided:
Any citizen . . . or alien . . . who by his . . . own industry, genius, efforts, and
expense, may have invented or produced any new and original design for a
manufacture, whether of metal or other material or materials, or any new and
original design for the printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or any
new and original design for a bust, statue, or has relief or composition in alto
or basso relievo, or any new and original impression or ornament, or to be
placed on any article of manufacture, the same being formed in marble or
other material, or any new and useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either
worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or cast or otherwise fixed on,
any article of manufacture, or any new and original shape or configuration of
any article of manufacture... who shall desire to obtain an exclusive property
or right therein to make, use, and sell and vend the same, or copies of the
same, to others, by them to be made, used, and sold, may make application
. . . to the Commissioner of Patents ... and the Commissioner... may grant
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Understandably, the question arises as to why the subject matter
of applied art found initial protection under the patent rather than the
copyright laws. One commentator has suggested that the answer lies in
the ultimate use of this applied art and the source of the suggested
need for the design patent statute.8 0 At the time the first design patent
legislation was enacted, copyright protection was reserved to works of
purely intellectual or fine art value.81 On the other hand, the existing
mechanical patent statutes were devoted to the furtherance and pro-
tection of industrial advancement. Thus, since the purpose of applied
designs was commercial enterprise, it was reasonable that regulation
fall under the patent laws.82 Additionally, it should be noted that it
was the recommendation of the Commissioner of Patents, and not the
Register of Copyrights, which informed Congress of the problem.8s
Through legislation enacted in 1870, the potential for overlapping
copyright and design patent protection became apparent.84 This po-
tential developed, in large part, from the presence of the word "useful"
as employed in both the 1842 and 1870 design patent statutes.85 Courts
were in disagreement as to whether the term "useful" was to be con-
strued in its usual sense, i.e., something of utilitarian operation, or
whether it meant merely that the design must have ornamental value.86
a patent therefore, as in the case now of application for a patent . . . the
duration of said patent shall be seven years ....
80 See Hudson, supra note 75, at 38.
81 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. In the Trade Mark Cases, 100
U.. 82 (1879), the Supreme Court delineated the scope of copyright coverage by noting,
"The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor . . . :" Id.
at 94 (emphasis in original). See also J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 816, 318 (7th
Cir. 1897).
82 See Hudson, supra note 75, at 583.
88 Id.
84 Section 71 of the 1870 Act, dealing with design patents, provided in relevant part:
[A]ny person who . . . has invented or produced any new and original design
for a manufacture, bust, statue ... or any new, useful, and original shape or
configuration of any article of manufacture, the same not having been known
or used by others before his invention or production thereof . . . may, upon
... due proceedings... as in cases of inventions or discoveries, obtain a patent
therefor.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198, 209.
85 In the 1870 statute "useful" appeared in the context of "any new, useful, and
original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture .... ." Id. (emphasis
added). In the 1842 version "useful" appeared as "any new and useful pattern, or print,
or picture, to be . . . worked into or . . . on . . . any article of manufacture .
Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543.
s0If the term was given its usual meaning, conceivably there would have been an
encroachment by the design patent law into the field of mechanical patents. The question
of dual design and mechanical patentability raises an issue parallel to that presented
in this Note. Two interesting articles discussing this matter are Megiey, Design and
Mechanical Patents Relating to the Same Subject Matter, 44 J. PAT. OFF. SoO'Y 809 (1962),
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Any existing conflict in interpretation87 was resolved by the Supreme
Court in Gorham Co. v. White.s8 Rejecting the more conventional
meaning of the term, the Court upheld the interpretation given in a
prior Patent Commission decision 9 that the legislative intent was
strictly to reserve design patents for those works imparting ornamental
beauty to articles of manufacture. Since Gorham, courts have consis-
and Gambrell, Mechanical and Design Inventions: Double Patenting Rejections and the
Doctrine of Election, 45 N.Y.U.L. RLv. 441 (1970).
87The troublesome word was given the more conventional interpretation in Ex
parte Bartholomew, 1869 Dec. Com. Pat. 103. Commissioner of Patents Fisher believed
that to deny a patent to a utilitarian design because it rendered no pleasing ornamen-
tation to the article and yet, to hold a design, having no utilitarian value patentable
merely because of its artful effect would be an absurdity. Id. at 105. This view ignored
the fact that new and useful utilitarian features were intended to be the subject of
mechanical patents. However, other cases followed this logic. See, e.g., Ex parte Crane,
1869 Dec. Com. Pat. 7 (Commissioner Foote construed the 1842 statute to embrace de-
signs for utility as well as designs relating to ornamentation); Ex parte Fenno, 1871 Dec.
Com. Pat. 52 (Acting Commissioner Duncan found that a design for a stove pipe damper,
hidden from view inside the flue pipe, was entitled to a design patent even though if
it was within open sight it would not be ornamental).
The contrary position was taken in Ex parte Parkinson, 1871 Dec. Com. Pat. 251.
See note 89 infra.
8881 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1872). Gorham involved design patent infringement
suit brought under the 1842 statute. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decisively construed
the design patent law as extending only to the inventive ornamental or aesthetic design
of an article of manufacture. See note 17 supra.
Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893), was decided on the basis of the
1870 statute where "useful" had been interposed in modification of "shape or con-
figuration of any article of manufacture." See note 84 supra. In Whitman Saddle, the
Court seemed to modify the Gorham ruling by stating: "where a new and original shape
or configuration of an article of manufacture is claimed, its utility may be also an
element for consideration." Id. at 678.
This apparent broadening of the Gorham decision, because of the position of the
word "useful" in the 1870 statute, did not mean, however, that design patents had any
viability in the realm of utilitarian function. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recognized this distinction in In re Tournier, 1901 Dec. Com. Pat. 206. The
Tournier court cited Whitman Saddle as introducing functional utility as an element
to be considered, but merely for the purpose of deciding whether a design merits a
patent in a close case:
We do not... understand the [Whitman Saddle] Court as intending to go fur-
ther than this, and to hold that functional utility is to be regarded as a con-
trolling or even an essential element in a patent for a design. For if so, the
design patents would virtually be placed upon the same footing ... [as] patents
for mechanical inventions.
Id. at 308.
The impact of Whitman Saddle has, however, lost virtually all of its force through
supervening legislation and subsequent case law rulings. See notes 39-40 supra & 94 infra.
89 Ex parte Parkinson, 1871 Dec. Com. Pat. 251, wherein the Commissioner ruled:
The legislature never intended by this section to let down the standard for
patents. It was never contemplated to grant a design patent for every possible
change of form that might be given to a machine or article of manufacture.
By "article of manufacture," as used in this section, the legislature evidently
meant only ornamental articles, articles used simply for decoration.
Id. at 252.
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tently foreclosed all aspects of mechanical utility when considering the
patentability of a design. 0
The interpretation of the word "useful" as meaning artistic or
pleasing to the sight constituted a major step in the development of
dual protection for artistic works since, at this juncture, both copy-
rights and design patents contemplated aesthetic qualities only. This
evolution continued when the design patent law was again modified
in 1902. The 1902 Act,9' which mirrors today's design patent defini-
tional section,9 2 used language of a more generic character, and thus
was thought to encompass all works Congress intended to be patent-
able as designs. 93 More significantly, the term "useful" was eliminated.
Instead, "ornamental" was substituted, thereby evidencing a legisla-
tive intent to restrict the influence of mechanical utility when consid-
ering the grant of a design patent. Since design patents now related to
the aesthetic aspects of a design,94 this change operated as a further
catalyst in the ultimate realization of common protection.
Copyright Evolution
To encourage and protect the writings of authors, Congress en-
acted the first copyright legislation in 1790.95 This Act, while limiting
90 See, e.g., Rowe v. Blodgett 8- Clapp Co., 112 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1901); Westinghouse
Elec. &. Mfg. Co. v. Triumph Elec. Co., 1900 Dec. Com. Pat. 219.
91 Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, § 1, 32 Stat. 193. This statute provided:
Any person who has invented any new, original, and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture, not known or used by others .. . before his invention
thereof may... by.. . due proceedings ... as in cases of inventions or dis-
coveries ...obtain a patent therefor.
9235 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
93 See Hudson, supra note 75, at 389.
04 There was some debate over the choice of a word to replace the term "useful."
The Patents Committee had suggested that the term "ornamental" be used in lieu of
"artistic." See id. Commissioner Allen, in his report to the Patents Committee, noted:
[I]f the present bill [S. 4647] shall become law the subject of design patents will
occupy its proper philosophical position in the field of intellectual production,
having upon the one side of it the statute providing protection to mechanical
constructions, and upon the other side the copyright law, whereby objects of
art are protected, reserving to itself the position of protecting objects of new
and artistic quality pertaining however, to commerce, but not justifying their
existence upon functional utility. If the design patent does not occupy this
position there is no other well defined position for it to take.
S. REP. No. 1139, 57th Cong., Ist Sess. (1902), reprinted in Hudson, supra note 75, at
390-91.
The term "ornamental" was eventually chosen to replace "useful," since the word
"artistic" was subject to different meanings under the mechanical and design patent
laws. See H.L RE'. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). Moreover, the change to
"ornamental" also carried forward the original intent underlying the first design patent
law of 1842. See Ex parte Knothe, 1903 Dec. Com. Pat. 42.
9 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
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the definition of "writings" to "any map, chart, book or books,"' 6
granted to the author "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprint-
ing, publishing and vending ... for . . . fourteen years." 97 Although
this initial legislation failed to include a generic definition of copy-
rightability, subsequent statutes expanded the original definitional
scope.98
As part of the major revision of the copyright and patent laws in
1870, additional materials were set forth as falling within the realm of
copyright protection.99 Moreover, an overlapping zone of protection
arose, since both the copyright and design patent revisions made pro-
vision for statues.10 0 However, dual coverage was foreclosed for "mod-
els or designs," since the copyright statute provided that in order to be
copyrightable, such items must have been "intended to be perfected
as works of the fine arts."' 01 Therefore, to the extent that "models or
96 Id.
97 Id. The term was renewable for an additional fourteen years at the election of
the author, should he be living upon the expiration of the original period. Id.
98 Under the 1802 statute, etchings, engravings, and designs for historical prints
were added to the list of copyrightable matter, Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat.
171. It is of interest that this statute extended its protection to "every person . . . who
shall invent and design, engrave . . . or from his own works and inventions, shall
cause to be designed . . . any historical or other print ..... Id. Such language was
confusing as it was more germane to a patent statute.
This expansive trend continued in 1831 when "musical compositions" were in-
cluded. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. The requirement that historical
prints be "invented or designed" was retained in this statute. Additionally, the copy-
right term was extended from 14 to 28 years. Id. But the 14 year renewal term was retained.
Id. § 2.
In 1856, dramatic compositions were included, and thus, playwrights and their
theatrical enterprises were brought within the copyright sphere. Act of Aug. 18, 1856,
ch. 169, § 1, 11 Stat. 138. Artistic photography was recognized in 1865 when Congress
supplemented the definitional scope with "photographs and the negatives thereof."
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540.
99Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198. This new definitional section
provided:
ihe author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any book, map, chart, dramatic
or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof,
of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs in-
tended to be perfected as works of the fine arts . . . shall . . . have the sole
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finish-
ing, and vending the same; and in the case of a dramatic composition, of pub-
licly performing or representing it, or causing it to be performed or represented
by others ....
Id.
100 Section 86, governing copyrights, spoke of statues and statuary, see id., while
the design patent section stated that a monopoly was available for "any new and orig-
inal design for a manufacture, bust, statue .... " Id. § 71.
101 See note 99 supra; Pogue, Borderland Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet,
52 MicH. L. REv. 33, 42 (1953). It would appear that Congress included this qualification
in recognition of the fact that design patents were intended to protect the industrial
application of artistic designs, whereas the copyright law had traditionally been limited
to works of a purely intellectual nature. The requisite of intended use in the fine arts,
therefore, was an attempt to reserve the copyright for purely artistic endeavor.
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designs" were intended to be incorporated into an "article of manu-
facture," design patents represented their only available means of pro-
tection.
Four years later, a further step was taken to prevent potential
double coverage. Section 3 of the 1874 Act extended the utilitarian
"intended use" sanction to engravings, cuts, or prints when applied to
pictorial illustrations. 10 2 If such illustrations were intended for com-
mercial purposes, their proprietor was foreclosed from a copyright and
had to register under the patent laws.1 3 This legislative attempt to
prevent simultaneous coverage was rendered less effective, however,
when the Supreme Court construed the 1874 statute as not precluding
copyright protection for advertising posters containing artistic prints.10 4
In weakening the "intended use" test, the Court noted: "Certainly
works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their pic-
torial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use -
if use means to increase trade and to help make money."'10 5 By so hold-
ing, the Court permitted the author to utilize a work of fine art for
commercial gain without subjecting the work to loss of copyright pro-
tection. This judicial inroad of the copyright into the commercial
sphere, previously occupied solely by the design patent, provided a
significant step forward in the ultimate realization of dual coverage.
Under copyright legislation enacted in 1909, the forerunner of to-
day's copyright definitional provision, 0 6 the statutory overlap came to
fruition. Pursuant to section 5 of the Act, there was no longer any re-
quirement that models or designs for works of art be perfected as
works of fine art.10 7 This deletion indicates that Congress sought to
102 Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 3, 18 Stat. 79. This section provided:
[]n the construction of this act, the words "Engraving," "cut" and "print" shall
be applied only to pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts,
and no prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture
shall be entered under the copyright law, but may be registered in the patent
office.
103 Id.
104 See Bleistein v. Donaldson LAthographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
105 Id. at 251. (emphasis added). The limitation placed on the "intended use" test
appears to be that the test is not failed if the engraving, cut, or print has the effect of
helping to make money. The Court reasoned that the limiting phrase, i.e., "connected
with the fine arts," only qualified the term "works." Id. at 250. Hence, a work may be
connected with the fine arts, have commercial use, and still not be precluded from a
copyright. The Court noted that "[a] picture is none the less a picture, and none the
less a subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement." Id. at 251.
10017 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
107 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1076.
The Copyright Act of 1909 also expanded the scope of copyrightable subject matter.
Of significance was the additional provision that those subjects listed as copyrightable
were not exhaustive but rather, were specific examples. Id. This was interpreted as
introducing a generic sense to the definition of a copyright.
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depart from the prior safeguards against overlapping coverage and to
expand the field of copyrightable works to include applied designs. 08
Indeed, subsequent legislative amendments, extending copyrightabil-
ity to "prints or labels used for articles of merchandise,"' 0 9 evidence
the congressional intent to discard the "fine art" intended use pre-
requisite.
Contrary to Congress' apparent intent, however, regulations
adopted by the Copyright Office shortly after the passage of the 1909
Act contained the stipulation that no copyright would be granted if
there was a utilitarian purpose for the work of art."0 Nevertheless,
consistent judicial refusal to bar copyright protection because of the
presence of such intent forced the Copyright Office to relax its posi-
tion."' Today, the present regulation takes no utilitarian purposes or
Also expanding the available coverage was § 4 of this statute which defined a copy-
right to "include all the writings of an author." Id. § 4 (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court had previously interpreted the word "writings," in Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), as including photographs. The term was meant to
encompass all the literary productions of authors including "all forms of writing . . .
by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression." Id. at 58.
Thus, Burrow-Giles considerably broadened the constitutional scope of copyrightable
material now embodied in § 4.
In reporting out the bill that finally resulted in the 1909 Act, the subcommittee
noted, with respect to § 4, that "works" might have been used instead of "writings"
because of the very broad sense in which the courts had interpreted "writings." Never-
theless, it was decided to maintain "writings" in the statute because the word was found
in the Constitution. This retention, however, was not intended to narrow the broad
judicial interpretation previously given the term. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1909). See also S. REP'. No. 6187, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1907).
108Testimony given before the Committee on Patents, relative to the passage of
the bill, is indicative of the congressional intent to extend copyright protection to ap-
plied designs. See Hearings on § 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before Comm. on Patents, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1906) (testimony of Librarian of Congress).
109 Act of July 31, 1939, ch. 396, § 2, 53 Stat. 1142. See also H.R. REP. No. 70, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939); S. RFt. No. 793, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1939), which indicate
the clear congressional intent to overrule the 1874 legislation that required such pic-
torials to be registered in the Patent Office if used as articles of manufacture.
110 Specifically, the early regulation stated:
12(g) Works of art. This term includes all works belonging fairly to the so-called
fine arts. (Paintings, drawings, and sculpture). Productions of the industrial arts
utilitarian in purpose and character are not subject to copyright registration,
even if artistically made or ornamented. No copyright exists in toys, games,
dolls, advertising, novelties, instruments or tools of any kind, glassware, embroi-
deries, garments, laces, woven fabrics, or any similar articles.
Regulation 12(g), reprinted in Pogue, Borderland Where Copyright and Design Patent
Meet, 52 MICH. L. Rav. 33, 44 (1953) (emphasis added).
11i The 1939 version of regulation 12(g) recognized that, as to artistic drawings, the
copyright grant was to be made in recognition of the artistic qualities of the drawing.
Future use for utilitarian gain would not preclude the copyright of the drawing. The
rule stated:
The protection of productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and
character, even if artistically made or ornamented, depends upon action under
the patent law; but registration in the Copyright Office has been made to protect
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intent into consideration provided the item may be classified as a work
of art. The regulation provides:
This class [works of art] includes published or unpublished works
of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their me-
chanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic
jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as works belong-
ing to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture.1 2
These successive legislative enactments, expanding copyright pro-
tection to include artistic works having commercial application and
patent coverage to encompass ornamental designs, evidence substan-
tial legislative thought and deliberation. The slow evolutionary pro-
cess itself would seem to rebut any argument that the overlapping
aspect of the patent and copyright laws was the result of congressional
inadvertence. Indeed, it would appear reasonable to conclude that
Congress sought to provide separate protection for the artistic and the
commercial ornamental values of the same work. Accordingly, the
concurrent protection extended by the Yardley court appears consis-
tent with this congressional intent.
Although an overview of legislative history would seemingly jus-
tify the Yardley decision, prior courts steadfastly refused to grant dual
coverage. Generally, these older decisions rested on the fear that such
protection would eventually be detrimental to the public good." 3 A
review of the pertinent cases will illustrate a gradual judicial move-
ment away from this restrictive approach, culminating in the Yardley
rationale.
JUDICIAL DENIAL OF CONCURRENT COVERAGE
Establishing the Election Doctrine
After enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, the existence of
an overlapping zone was judicially recognized." 4 Nevertheless, dual
artistic drawings notwithstanding that they may afterwards be utilized for articles
of manufacture.
37 C.F.R. § 201.4(b)(7) (1939).
.112Id. § 202.10(a) (1974).
113 See text accompanying notes 122-32 infra.
114 See Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929) (in
action for copyright infringement, copyright was denied validity because of prior design
patent grant); In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (denial of a design patent ap-
plication because of prior copyright registration); William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (action based on breach of trust in
the use of an uncopyrighted and unpatented design); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier,
16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (action in copyright infringement); Louis Dejonge & Co.
v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150 (C.C.S.E.D. Pa. 1910), aft'd, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911),
aff'd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914).
At the same time, it has been held that there is no overlap between copyright and
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registration was disallowed, and the individual was permitted to pro-
ceed under only one of the statutory schemes. This "doctrine of elec-
tion" was first enunciated in Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker &
Kessler Co.1 5 The plaintiff had copyrighted a small painting, depict-
ing branches of sprigs of holly, mistletoe, and spruce, which was re-
printed on seasonal wrapping paper. Seemingly infringing on
plaintiff's statutory right, defendant copied this design on its own
wrapping paper. In defense of its action, the defendant claimed the
design was not copyrightable because of its utilitarian use. It was ar-
gued that a copyright should be limited to pure works of art, and that
this design, to be properly protected, should have been patented."8
The court rejected the defendant's contentions and held that a
copyright could not be found invalid merely because the author put
his labor to utilitarian use. Such utilization did not make the painting
any less a work of art and it was the artistic aspect which was meant to
be protected by the copyright. 17 The court further stated that the de-
sign might have been eligible, in addition, for a patent, thereby ac-
quiring the protection of both statutory schemes." 8 Inexplicably,
however, the court decided that if the owner was entitled to either
monopoly, he could not procure both. The De Jonge court rational-
ized:
The method of procedure, the term of protection, and the penal-
mechanical patents. In Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 189 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.
1943), plaintiff brought a copyright infringement suit for the copying of its blank re-
cording charts that were fitted into its patented recording and measuring instruments.
The court held that the chart was a mechanical element of the recording device and
was not itself a means of passing on information to the public; the chart itself neither
taught nor explained any art or process. Thus, the blank chart was not copyrightable.
Id. at 100.
The absence of any overlap between copyright and mechanical patents was reaffirmed
in Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947), a suit against the
Register of Copyrights regarding the copyrightability of recording charts. Here also the
question turned on the fact that these charts did not themselves teach or explain any
art. The court stated that "[a]rticles intended for practical use in cooperation with a
machine are not copyrightable." Id. at 911. Further, the court noted that "[b]oth law
and policy forbid monopolizing a machine except within the comparatively narrow limits
of the patent." Id.
It is clear that the court was limiting its remarks to copyrights and mechanical
patents because the word "machine" was used. Nevertheless, both Taylor Instrument
and Brown Instrument have caused some confusion where enterprising defendants have
attempted to apply the precedent of these two cases to the copyright versus design patent
issue. See, e.g., Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1951).
115 182 F. 150 (C.C.S.E.D. Pa. 1910), aff'd, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911), af'd, 235 U.S.
88 (1914).
116 182 F. at 150.
"7 The court relied upon Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 289
(1908). See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
118 182 F. at 151.
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ties for infringement, are so different that the author or owner of
a [work] that is eligible for both classes must decide to which re-
gion of intellectual effort the work is to be assigned, and he must
abide by the decision.1 9
The rationale underlying the election doctrine surfaced in In re
Blood,20 wherein the plaintiff was denied a patent for his design of a
hosiery ticket since the design had been previously copyrighted. This
factual situation was similar to Yardley in that both protections were
sought in the same sequence. Citing De Jonge as controlling, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the applicant
was feasibly entitled to either grant, but that the prior copyright barred
a subsequent patent.121 The court reasoned that the election doctrine
was necessary, because allowance of both protections "would result
for all practical purposes in an extension of the design monopoly.' ' 22
Unfortunately, the court ventured no reason as to why undue exten-
sion of the patent monopoly would result.
Despite the lack of explanation for this supposed fear, there is
some available support for the proposition that monopolies would be
prolonged at the public's expense should dual coverage be permitted.
The basis for judicial apprehension and the resultant election doctrine
may well be found in Baker v. Selden,123 an 1880 Supreme Court de-
cision. In Baker, the complainant had copyrighted a series of publica-
tions which described a system of bookkeeping utilizing ledger
columns and headings. The defendant's system was similar, but em-
ployed a somewhat different arrangement. Alleging an infringement,
the complainant argued that the copyright gave him the exclusive use
of the system described in his books.12 4
In rejecting this argument, the Baker Court held that where copy-
ing of copyrighted materials is for purposes of use, rather than for ex-
planation, no infringement occurs. 1 25 Of more significance to the
119 The court in Yardley noted that the Dejonge election doctrine was merely dicta.
In DeJonge, relief was ultimately denied because the plaintiff had failed to comply with
the statutory requirements as to copyright notice. The court's statements as to design
patentability and overlap were unnecessary to its decision. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court affirmed the result based upon the question of copyright notice. No opinion by
the Court was rendered as to the doctrine of election. See Louis De Jonge & Co. v.
Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150 (C.C.S.E.D. Pa. 1910), aff'd, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911),
aff'd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914).
12023 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
124 Id. at 101.
125 Id. at 103. The Court stated:
[Wjhere the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and
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present discussion, however, is dicta found within the opinion. As to
artistic models and designs, works which come within the overlapping
coverage, the Supreme Court refused to apply the permissive use rule.
The Court stated:
Of course, [this rule is] not intended to apply to ornamental de-
signs, or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it
may be said that their form is their essence, and their object the
production of pleasure in their contemplation. This is their final
end. They are as much the product of genius and the result of
composition as are the lines of the poet or the historian's periods.1 6
The doctrine of election, therefore, may be viewed as an out-
growth of judicial recognition that ornamental or aesthetic designs are
afforded a high degree of protection under the copyright laws. If a
designer obtained a patent for his creation, upon expiration of the
patent the public would be free to copy the design in every detail.
However, if a copyright was also granted and still in effect at the ter-
mination of the patent, the public would be prohibited from copying,
even if the copying was for "use."1.' 7 Thus, the argument is made that
if the designer acquires a patent, giving him the exclusive right to use,
manufacture, and sell the design, a concurrent or subsequent copyright
would for all practical purposes amount to an extension of the design
monopoly.128
diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such
methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and
given therewith to the public; not given for the purpose of publication in other
works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical application.
Id.
See also Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Plain-
tiff copyrighted a drawing showing a new type of bridge approach to be used as a means
of unsnarling traffic. The defendants built an approach based upon plaintiff's copy-
righted design. The court, finding no infringement, said Baker controlled. For a more
recent discussion of the use issue, see Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th
Cir. 1967).
126 101 U.S. at 103-04. Subsequently, lower courts have consistently held that three-
dimensional reproductions of copyrighted models or designs for works of art, even though
for use, constitute a copyright infringement. See, e.g., Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A.
Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934). But cf. Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp.
1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
127 See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.PA. 1974) (argument of the Com-
missioner of Patents). The term of protection under a design patent is generally shorter
than that under copyright registration. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1970), with 17 id. § 24,
as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
128 Perhaps this is the reasoning which underlies the regulation of the Copyright
Office disallowing the grant of a copyright if there has been a prior design patent issued
on the work of art.
The potential availability of protection under the design patent law will not
affect the registrability of a work of art, but a copyright claim in a patented
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This reasoning is insufficient to justify the election mandate. Ted
Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co. 120 is, perhaps, illustrative of the point.
There, a pencil sharpener in the form of an antique telephone casing
was held to be copyrightable as a work of art since its artistic quality
had an independent existence. 130 Assuming, arguendo, that the design
was patentable as well, during the life of the patent others would be
prevented from applying this ornamental design to an article of manu-
facture. Upon the expiration of the design patent, the design would be
free for public use. The remaining copyright would only protect the
owner from the slavish copying of his antique casing and any notice-
able variation in a similar casing would foreclose a copyright infringe-
ment claim. 131 Accordingly, the persisting copyright, limited to its
protection of pure art and constrained by the high burden of proof of
infringement, would not effectively extend the total monopoly of a
design patent. The copyright, rather than extending the design patent,
would provide no more protection than if the design patent had not
been initially obtained.132
Despite its apparent lack of necessity, courts continued to follow
the election doctrine. In Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood,
Inc.,133 plaintiff obtained a patent and later brought suit for infringe-
ment of a pending copyright on the same work. The court, utilizing a
different rationale for the election rule, held that, apart from the mo-
nopoly granted under the patent, the prior design patent application
constituted a public disclosure of the art contained in the design. The
court reasoned, therefore, that such disclosure barred the subsequent
copyright grant since no. copyright would be available for the original
text of a work already in the public domain.134
design or in the drawings or photographs in a patent application will not be
registered after the patent has been issued.
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1974). There is no statutory basis for this regulation other than
the broad power given to the Register to promulgate regulations.
120 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
130 Copyrightability in cases where pure art resides in a utilitarian host article de-
pends upon whether the pure art can stand apart. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1974); text
accompanying note 21 supra.
131 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
132 The actual absence of danger was recognized by an eminent writer on the subject:
While in doubtful cases the Courts will hold that, presumptively, the fact that
a given work is patentable is ground for holding it is not copyrightable and vice
versa it seems that there is no rule of law nor is there any consideration of public
policy which will prevent the issuance of both a copyright and a patent to cover
the same work in its different aspects ....
J. WEL, CoPYR GHT Lmw 84-85 (1917) (emphasis added).
133 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929).
134 Id. at 729. This holding seems to provide good argument for the subsequent bar
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The persisting judicial adherence to the election rule is difficult
to justify. In each instance, the particular court had no problem in
differentiating the separate aspects of the work respectively contem-
plated by the copyright and design patent statutes. These cases con-
sistently held that the utilitarian use of a copyrightable design would
neither bar nor render an existing copyright void. 35 Why the courts
recognized that it was the art value protected by the copyright, irre-
spective of any utilitarian ornamentation, and yet demanded election
cannot be fully comprehended.136
Mazer v. Stein - Relaxing the Election Doctrine?
The impact of the election doctrine was lessened by a series of
cases culminating with the Supreme Court's decision in Mazer v.
Stein. 37 The Steins were the owners of copyrights on artistic statuettes
of male and female Balinese and Egyptian dancers, their intention
being to fit the items with threaded mounting stubs for the adaption
of electrical sockets. Thus fitted, the statuettes were to become decora-
tive lamp bases. Alleging copyright infringement, the Steins contended
that the defendants' lamps incorporated copies of the Steins' copy-
righted artistic bases.
In two lower court decisions, the defendants prevailed upon the
theory that the Steins sought to protect by means of copyright a utili-
tarian lamp, rather than an artistic statue. Such protection was not
contemplated by the copyright law. 38 In holding for the defendants,
of the alternate monopoly. The force of this case appears diluted, however, in fight of
the prevalent view that the mere filing of a work in a public record does not of itself
constitute disclosure. See, e.g., Douglas Int'l Corp. v. Baker, 335 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 819 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Patent application filing is usually the result of governmental command and is not a
matter of choice. The general rule is that, to relinquish the right to a copyright, pub-
lishing must be an act of free will, not one of compulsion. See I Nixmim, THE LAw OF
COPYRIGHT § 58.3 (1974).
Cases subsequent to Korzybski continued to breathe vitality into the election doc-
trine. See, e.g., William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp.
264 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Jones Bros. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
'35 See, e.g., William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp.
264 (W.D. Pa. 1951):
The plaintiff's design being novel and original could have been the subject of a
design patent.... Furthermore, the plaintiff would have been entitled . . . to
invoke the protection of the copyright laws . . . since the creation would fall
within the terms of the Copyright Act... as [a work] of art ....
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
136 See text accompanying notes 117-19 supra.
'37 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
138 In Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 96 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 188 F.2d 611
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951), the defendants asserted that since the
statuettes were intended for utilitarian use, they were removed from the traditional
concept of art. Expert Lamp contended that plaintiffs' should have sought design
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the courts misinterpreted a Copyright Office regulation which defined
artistic craftsmanship as copyrightable to the extent of its form but not
its utilitarian aspects .139 Each decision construed the regulation as hav-
ing no bearing on works primarily intended for commercial enter-
prise.140 Other unrelated decisions dealing with the Steins' copyright
properly upheld plaintiffs' infringement claims. The courts recognized
that the works sought to be protected were the statuettes and not the
lamps. The copyrightability of these figures was held not to be lost
merely because they were used as "dress" for utilitarian objects.141
patent protection. 96 F. Supp. at 98. The district court agreed and construed Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), as allowing Expert Lamp to copy the statuary for use
as a lamp base. 96 F. Supp. at 98. This holding, however, clearly conflicted with the
express exception for works of art carved out by the Baker Court. See text accom-
panying notes 123-26 supra. Furthermore, despite prior judicial recognition, the court
noted that no overlap existed between the copyright and the design patent laws. This
dictum, based on Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawrey-Brost Co., 189 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.
1943), appears misplaced, as Taylor Instrument recognized the absence of overlap
between copyright and mechanical patents. See note 114 supra.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit sustained the lower court's decision, agreeing that
there should be no copyright protection for an article of manufacture. 188 F.2d at 612.
The Steins asserted that it was not the lamps they sought to copyright, but rather the
artistic bases apart from their utilitarian embodiment. Id. The appellate court nonthe-
less found the lamp to be the item sought to be copyrighted. In the court's view, if the
Steins desired to protect a lamp, the proper avenue would have been the procurement of
a design patent. Id. This viewpoint was evident in the court's statement that "[w]e ...
are not persuaded that a design of an electric lamp may be protected as a monopoly by
means of copyright registration, registered without an examination as to originality,
novelty or inventiveness." Id.
In Stein v. Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated, 214 F2d 822
(6th Cir. 1954), although the district court fully recognized that the copyright protected
the artistic bases only, it followed the Expert Lamp intended-use test. Reasoning that
the copyright wtas invalid because of the intended commercial use, the court held
that the appropriate protection was a design patent. 109 F. Supp. at 866.
13o 87 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1974).
140 See, e.g., Stein v. Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 864, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated,
214 F.2d 822 (6th Cir. 1954).
141 In Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Cal. 1952), affd, 205 F.2d 688 (9th
Cir. 1958), the district court explicitly rejected the intended-use test espoused in Expert
Lamp. 103 F. Supp. at 231. As the court aptly stated: "To uphold this argument would be
to require the Judicial inquiry to plumb the mind of every copyright proprietor and
determine his plans and intentions at the time of registration. This impossibility is not
contemplated by the Statute." Id.
In affirming this result, the Ninth Circuit discussed in more detail the overlapping
region between copyrights and design patents. The court strongly suggested that a given
work could embody the requisites of both schemes, and that nothing in either the copy-
right or design patent laws would exclude the operation of the other. The court expressly
stated:
We do not read the design patent law as stronger or prevailing over the copy-
right law, hence we are of the opinion that when the creator of the statuettes
was granted copyright privileges as to them, such privileges became rights and
cannot be affected by a speculation that possibly the objects could have been
patented as designs . . . . [There is nothing in the design-patent laws which
excludes a work of art from the operation of the copyright laws.
205 F.2d at 635.
In Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 859 (D. Md.), rev'd, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953),
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Although none of the Stein cases directly concerned the issue of
overlap, the clear thrust of the decisions illustrated that the copyright
validity of artistic craftsmanship was to be determined by divorcing
the artistic value from the utilitarian article. If such value could be
found in and of itself, the utilitarian ornamentation secondarily im-
parted to an article, such as a lamp, was not material to the operation
of the copyright law.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mazer v. Stein'4 in or-
der to resolve the conflict with respect to the validity of the Steins'
copyright. The issue framed for the Court was whether the copyright
law would protect an artist who intended to mass-produce his work of
art as part of a utilitarian article. The petitioners contended that when
such an artist becomes a manufacturer, his work passes out of the
realm of copyright. Any further protection the artist might desire
would be subject to the tests of the design patent law.143
Mr. Justice Reed, after reviewing the statutory history of copy-
rights, rejected petitioners' assertions and concluded that the utilitar-
ian use of the statuettes did not bar their copyrightability as works of
af'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the district court believed that the Steins were claiming that
it was unlawful for the defendant to use the copyrighted statuary as bases for table
lamps. The court did not consider the work of art exception to the Baker rule and
found for the defendant, implying that the Steins erred in not seeking a design patent.
Clearly, the district court erroneously believed the work sought to be protected was
the lamp. This opinion is difficult to justify since the Register of the Copyright Office
testified that it was the practice of the Copyright Office to disregard any utilitarian
feature or intended commercial use in considering registration. 111 F. Supp. at 362-63.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and carefully distinguished the differing nature of
copyrights and design patents. The court noted that the copyright does not protect a
particular subject, but rather the treatment of the subject. Moreover, this appellate
court framed the true issue running throughout the series of cases:
[he issue is not whether a design of an electric lamp may be protected as a
monopoly by means of a copyrighted registration. Rather, the issue is whether a
copyrighted statue may be copied irrespective of its use as a statue or as a
component part of an electric lamp, or any other article of manufacture.
204 F.2d at 475. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the reasoning of Expert Lamp and
Benaderet and relied heavily upon the testimony of the Register of Copyrights as to
the actual intent of the Copyright Office Regulations. Id. at 476: This court decided
that the copyright of the statuettes barred their unauthorized copying in the medium
of a utilitarian article. As the court lucidly stated:
[A] copyright does not purport to give to the copyrightee any rights to the
mechanical or utilitarian uses of a work of art. A copyright does, however,
protect the work of art qua work of art without regard to any functional use
to which it might be put.
Id. at 471. The court, however, expressly refused to discuss the question of copyright
and design patent oyerlap. Id. at 480.
142 347 U.S. 201 (1953).
143 Id. at 205. The registration of the statue, coupled with its use as a lamp base,
was claimed to be an illicit attempt to monopolize the manufacture of the lamps.
Id. at 206.
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art.14 Although the Court expressly declined to decide whether the
statuettes were also patentable, 145 the respective protection given by
each scheme was distinguished.
Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art
disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea -
not the idea itself .... [Cjopyright protects originality rather than
novelty or invention. . . .Thus, respondents may not exclude
others from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; they
may only prevent use of copies of their statuettes as such or as in-
corporated in some other article. 46
Thus, the Steins did not possess a monopoly on the use of dancing fig-
ures as lamp bases. Others, merely by manufacturing alternate figures,
could have reaped the fruits of the Steins' idea without incurring li-
ability. The Steins' copyrights only prevented the copying of their
artistry.14'
Although the question of election was not in issue, the Court
lessened the harshness of the doctrine by stating:
Though other courts have passed upon the issue as to whether...
the election of the author or patentee of one bars a grant of the
other, we do not. We do hold that the patentability of the statu-
ettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works
of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that be-
cause a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should
not so hold.14s
It is readily apparent, therefore, that the Court recognized the exis-
144 Id. at 218.
145 Id. at 217. One court has held that a statuette, mounted on and part of an
ashtray, was not patentable because of the absence of invention in the design. Frankart,
Inc. v. Apt Novelty Co., 57 F.2d 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
146 347 U.S. at 217-18.
147 This reasoning aids greatly in determining the validity of the concurrent pro-
tection existing in Yardley. The Spiro Agnew watch face copyright would give the copy-
rightee no monopoly over the manufacture and sale of watches bearing the caricature
of political personalities. Other caricatures, capable of equal commercial success, could
be used. The import of Mazer v. Stein is that the copyright law grants no monopoly
over an article of manufacture that may embody the artistic component or ornamenta-
tion. The mere copying of the artwork is the only actionable infringement contemplated
by the statute.
148347 U.S. at 217. This statement seems to vitiate the effect of the Copyright
Office regulations that foreclose copyright protection to a previously patented design if
the design patent should subsequently be held invalid. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1974).
Furthermore, although the Court did not pass on the validity of the election doctrine,
its language dilutes the full force of the doctrine in that if an election is made and the
choice subsequently invalidated, resort to the alternate scheme would not be barred.
The Supreme Court's statement lessens the blow of the election by not binding the
"author-inventor" to a bad choice.
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tence of a zone of overlap, holding that patentability and copyright-
ability were not mutually exclusive. Left unanswered, however, was
the question whether an individual must choose only one of the two
schemes open to him.
Different facets of the decision can be combined to suggest the
probable resolution of this unanswered question. Based on Mazer, it
is apparent that a copyright protects its owner from the plagiarism of
the original aesthetic form or expression. The validity of this protec-
tion extends only to the art without regard to its utilitarian function.
Accordingly, the aspects protected by the copyright and design patent
are distinct. For the copyright, it is original pure art divorced from
any utilitarian embodiment, while for the design patent, it is inventive
artistic ornamentation applied to commercial endeavor.14 Such anal-
ysis, coupled with the holding that copyrights and design patents are
not mutually exclusive, would lead one to conclude that the Court,
under proper circumstances, would sanction dual protection.'5 0
Subsequent to Mazer v. Stein, judicial treatment of the overlap-
ping zone of protection has been rare. The only decision prior to
Yardley seemingly concerned with the question of dual protection is
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch
Co.,' 51 where both design patent and copyright infringement were
claimed. Although the district court ultimately found that there was
no enforceable copyright, the court saw nothing wrong with concur-
rent reliance on both claims. 52
149 See text accompanying note 146 supra.
150 It is of interest that the Register of Copyrights filed a brief as amicus curiae in
the Supreme Court. 347 U.S. at 202. In urging the Court to affirm the Fourth Circuit
validation of the Steins' copyrights, the Register argued that the copyright should be
upheld regardless of the fact that this could lead to situations where designers might
be entitled to either statutory protection. The Register also asserted that the availability
of one class would not preclude the other.
151 155 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1958).
152 The court stated:
The law as to the relationship between copyright and design patent claims is in
an unsettled state [citing Mazer v. Stein] . .. and patent counsel are to be com-
mended in seeking for their clients protection under both heads upon the
theory that protection under one or the other may be upheld by the courts.
155 F. Supp. at 936. This statement is indicative of the impact of the Supreme Court's
dilution of the election doctrine.
On appeal, the district court's upholding of the plaintiff's design patent claim was
reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the question of anticipation in the
design. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260
F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958). However, in dictum, the Second Circuit recognized the viability
of dual protection, stating: "[W]e do not think that a copyright which is not enforce-
able, even though it may be theoretically in existence, is an obstacle to securing and
enforcing a patent." Id. at 642.
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The Yardley ruling thus represents a culmination of growing judi-
cial acceptance of dual protection. Prior to Yardley, the stage had been
set for the end of the election doctrine. Courts had moved from the
enunciation of the doctrine in In re Blood,15 3 to its more detailed ex-
amination in the Stein cases'54 and finally to the Mazer v. Stein, 55 hold-
ing that copyright and design patent protections are not mutually
exclusive. It is now clear that copyright validity is to be considered
apart from utilitarian use while design patent viability can only be
considered in conjunction with commercial application. Moreover, the
inquiry under each consideration can only be answered by resort to
different tests - the relaxed standard of original creative endeavor for
the copyright and the stringent demands of invention, novelty, and
nonobviousness for the design patent. If a given work can pass muster
in both of these vastly different settings, then dual protection should
follow.
CONCLUSION
Yardley represents the first direct judicial acceptance of concurrent
protection. The court properly determined that there are no sound
statutory or judicial reasons why an artist-inventor should be denied
the respective rewards owing to the distinctive aspects of his work,
each reward being "commensurate with the services rendered."'15 6 In-
deed, the doctrine of election seems contradictory to the avowed pur-
pose of both the copyright and design patent laws. Both statutes seek
to foster the use of the intellect in devising new forms of art and com-
mercial ornamentation. There would be no incentive for the artist-
inventor to strive for gains in both spheres if he knew that dual
protection was foreclosed. This injustice has been laid to rest by the
Yardley logic that neither statute contemplates those aspects protected
by the other and that both can exist concurrently in a model or design
for a work of art, provided the necessary requirements of each scheme
are met.15
7
153 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
154 See notes 138-41 and accompanying text supra.
'55 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
156 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
157 Yardley is not the first instance where both concurrent copyright and design
patent protection has existed. See Wilson v. Haber Bros., Inc., 275 F. 346 (2d Cir. 1921).
In Wilson, the subject of both a copyright and a design patent was a doll known as
"kewpie." The plaintiff alleged both copyright and design patent infringement. The de-
fendant, however, was precluded from contesting the validity of either because of a prior
consent decree signed by the defendant conceding that both the copyright and design
patent were valid. This case preceded In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927), but was
not mentioned in the Blood opinion. Perhaps the effect of Wilson had not yet been fully
understood.
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Although a prospective dual copyrightee-design patentee can now
operate within the framework of both statutes, Yardley may be a hol-
low victory. Patent prerequisites are comparatively easier to establish
for mechanical hardware than for ornamental designs. A reason for
this lies in the nature of design. Although definition is difficult, a de-
sign has been described in the following terms: "The essence of a
design resides, not in the elements individually, nor in their method
of arrangement, but ... in that indefinable whole that awakens some
sensation in the observer's mind."' 5 This highly subjective quality
has been recognized by the Supreme Court.159 Thus, it seems inappro-
priate to apply the same objective tests, readily discernible in hard-
ware, to works of a purely aesthetic nature. Nevertheless, the tests of
novelty, inventiveness, and nonobviousness must be met before a de-
sign patent will issue.160
As a result, it has become extremely difficult to obtain a design
patent. Over the past 20 years, the number of design patents issued per
year has remained relatively static."6' However, the number of mechan-
158 Pelouze Scale & Mfg. Co. v. American Cutlery Co., 102 F. 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1900).
159 See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1872).
160 The opinion offered in In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966), would, in
theory, be more hospitable to the encouragement of commercial designs. There, the
court, in refusing to apply the literal requirements of nonobviousness to designers, stated:
We cannot equate them with the mechanics in the mechanic vs. inventor test
for patentability. The test . . .must be applied in a way which will implement
the legislative intent to promote progress in the field of industrial design by
means of the patent incentive.
Id. at 1006. See note 32 supra. The basic subjective nature of a design was again relied
on by the Ninth Circuit in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444
F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970). In following the reasoning of Laverne, the court noted that
because all individuals react differently, the test is of necessity nonobjective and, as
such, the "determination of patentability in design cases must finally rest on the sub-
jective conclusion of each judge." Id. at 300, quoting In re Bartlett, 300 F.2d 942, 944
(C.C.P.A. 1962).
For those creations falling in the present overlapping band, the subject matter of
both copyright and design patent relates to aesthetic appeal. See Umbreit, A Considera-
tion of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. Rxv. 932, 934 (1939). In view of this underlying common
aspect, it has been suggested that there may have been a fundamental error in incorpo-
rating designs into the patent laws in the first instance. See Williams, Copyright Regis-
tration of Industrial Designs, 7 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 740 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Wil-
liams]. As noted previously, incorporation of design protection under patent laws was
the result of a plea from the Commissioner of Patents and the fact that in 1842 the sole
existing protection for such commercial ventures was granted in patents. See Hudson,
supra note 75, at 383. Former Commissioner of Patents Allen, in speaking before the
congressional committee concerning the passage of the 1902 design patent statute, viewed
the design patent as occupying a middle ground between copyright and mechanical
patent. Id. at 390-91. Of course, for all intents and purposes, Congress, by statutorily
applying all of the tests for mechanical patents to design patents, effectively removed
the design patent from its "philosophical" middle ground where it was thought to be
proper. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
161 1972 COMM'R OF PATENTs ANN. R aP. 13 (Table 4).
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ical patents has doubled in the same period of time.1 62 The number
of copyrights for subjects in the overlapping zone has also grown. 63
This retardation in the number of design patents issued indicates that
the advancement of ornamental designs for commercial articles is be-
ing hindered, rather than helped, by the prospective patentee having
to meet the burdens of the patent system.
Due to the minimum use of design patent protection, the repeal
of the design patent law has often been suggested.' 64 Coupled with this
cry for repeal, proposed reforms, aimed at mitigating the rigors of de-
sign protection, have been recurrent.165 For the present, however,
Yardley offers the correct conceptual approach for acquiring both copy-




163 The number of copyrights registered for works in the overlapping band has
risen from 5200 in 1967-1968 to 7400 in 1971-1972. 1972-1973 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT
ANN. REP. 15.
164 See Williams, supra note 160.
165 In the period from 1914 to 1935, no less than 82 bills were introduced in Congress.
See Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235, 245 n.28 (1944). Typically, these proposals
sought to bring the protection of designs under the copyright statute. Illustrative was
H.R. 14,666, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916), which sought to establish copyright protection
for any new and original design to be embodied in or applied to a manufactured product.
For an example of a more recent proposal, see Title III of the draft of the General
Revision of the Copyright Law, S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This proposal pro-
vided for copyright protection for "Ornamental Designs of Useful Articles." Id. § 801 et seq.
166 Yardley, of course, could very well be reversed on the issue of nonobviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970), without the issue of dual protection having to be passed
upon. See note 59 supra.
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